JUST ME

01/10/2026

t is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against him, which is part and parcel of the rights accorded to an accused enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. 13 Sections 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, in turn, pertinently provides:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.-A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. (emphasis added)

21/09/2026

PUPBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE
https://www.divinalaw.com/dose-of-law/public-figure-doctrine/

Published 15 August 2022, The Daily Tribune

In this digital age, information can spread like wildfire, leaving a trail of publicity — whether uninvited or desired — in its wake.

The Philippine Constitution expressly upholds the right to free speech. However, this right is not absolute. The Supreme Court has ruled that defamatory statements are unprotected speech, as “any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” (Philippine Journalists Inc. vs Thoenen, 477 SCRA at 492, citing Chaplinsky vs New Hampshire)

Defamation — which includes libel and slander — means the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the person, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about him/her. (MVRS Publications vs Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, 396 SCRA at 211, 2003)

The laws against defamation weigh two competing values against each other, namely, the “fundamental right to freedom of speech on one hand, and the state’s interest to protect persons against the harmful conduct of others.” (Disini Jr. vs Secretary of Justice, 723 SCRA 109, 133-138, 2014)

This premise becomes difficult to navigate when we talk about public figures. These may involve people who either seek the limelight, or are unwittingly thrown into the lions’ den of public scrutiny.

Who is a public figure under the law?

The Supreme Court has defined a public figure as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling, which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a “public personage.” He is, in other words, a celebrity. He/she is anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. (Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, 874, 1988)

Our laws on defamation are tilted against public figures, who have to pass the actual malice standard in order to hold their detractors liable for defamation.

There is “actual malice,” or malice in fact, when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. (Disini Jr. vs The Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, at 112, 2014)

While it is difficult for public figures to succeed in filing cases for defamation, by no means are they denied of the means for the vindication of their rights. A person who becomes a public figure, by choice or by fate, does not lose his or her right to preserve his or her own good name and reputation. The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property.

As stated in the Book of Proverbs, “(a) good name is more desirable than great riches; to be esteemed is better than silver or gold.” (Proverbs 22:1)

For more of Dean Nilo Divina’s legal tidbits, please visit www.divinalaw.com. For comments and questions, please send an email to [email protected].

Published 15 August 2022, The Daily Tribune In this digital age, information can spread like wildfire, leaving a trail of publicity — whether uninvited or desired — in its wake. The Philippine Constitution expressly upholds the right to free speech. However, this right is not absolute. The Supre...

17/09/2026

WHEN PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY FAILS IN R.A. 9165
People v. Espera, G.R. No. 227313, April 21, 2026
People v. Espera clarifies that the presumption of regularity is not absolute in R.A. 9165 cases. It fails once the prosecution’s own evidence shows material noncompliance with Section 21.
In this case, police arrested the accused for dangerous drugs. But two violations were proven by the State’s own witnesses. First, no insulating witnesses were present at or near the place of arrest. Under People v. Nisperos, the elected official, DOJ, and media representatives must physically witness the inventory at the locus. This is a substantive safeguard.
Second, the inventory and photographing were done at the PDEA Regional Office. The elected official testified that the accused was "presented to him during the inventory," proving the procedure was not done on site.
The prosecution also failed to allege or prove any justifiable ground for the deviation.
Thus, the Court ruled that neither presumption of regularity nor substantial compliance could save the case. Unjustified deviation from Sec. 21 requires suppression of evidence and acquittal.
In dangerous drugs cases, the presumption of regularity collapses when the prosecution proves its own failure to comply with Sec. 21 R.A. 9165 without justification.

17/09/2026

(People v. Albis, G.R. No. 266701, July 8, 2026)
RA 9165: THE NECESSITY OF PROVING IDENTITY OF INSULATING WITNESSES
In one recent case, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused for failure to positively prove the identity of the Punong Barangay witness under Sec. 21, R.A. 9165. Photos and a signature were held insufficient. The identity cannot be presumed. This safeguards chain of custody, upholds the right to confrontation, and enforces strict compliance in drug cases. Signature is not identity. A photo is not identification.
(People v. Albis, G.R. No. 266701, July 8, 2026) See less

15/09/2026

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/69144

SPerformance

15/09/2026

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/62638
specific performance

Respondents Emmanuel and Tita Manzano (the Manzanos) were the registered owners of a 35,281-square meter parcel of land with improvements in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 160752.

15/09/2026

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/62806

Specific Performance

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] is the December 11, 2013 Decision[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 07711 that set aside the February 19, 2013 Order[5] of the RTC, Branch 17, Cebu City dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 for lack of jurisdiction.

10/09/2026

Motion to Postpone is a
privilege, not a right.

Pre-trial answers the call for the speedy disposition of cases.6 Under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the counsels and the parties are mandated to appear at pre-trial.7 Their non-appearance may be excused only if there is a valid cause or if a representative appears on their behalf.8 If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and may render judgment based on it.9

This Court has ruled that a motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right.10 The movant should not assume that his motion would be granted.11

In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone the pretrial, the court must take into account two factors: (a) the reason given, and (b) the merits of the movant’s case.12

Philippine Jurisprudence - Benjamin L. Vergara, et al. Vs. Atty. Eusebio I. Otadoy, Jr.

03/08/2026

CASE ANALYSIS | WHY CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE IS MALA IN SE
The Supreme Court in People v. Rose, et al., G.R. No. 276965, July 8, 2026 ruled that carnapping with homicide is a mala prohibita. This classification caught my attention because of its implications on intent and absorption of crimes.
In Rose, the accused robbed the victim of his wallet and money, seized his tricycle, and caused his death. The Court affirmed convictions for both Robbery with Homicide under the Revised Penal Code and Carnapping with Homicide under R.A. 10883. To sustain both convictions, the Court held that mala in se cannot absorb mala prohibita.
I respectfully submit, with due respect to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rose, that carnapping with homicide is substantively mala in se because it punishes conduct that is inherently wrong, requires proof of criminal intent, and originated from theft under the Revised Penal Code.
First, by nature. Carnapping involves the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle through violence, intimidation, or stealth. It impairs fundamental rights to property and personal security. Like theft and robbery, the act is wrongful in itself and independent of any statute.
Second, by statutory element. Section 2 of R.A. 10883 defines carnapping as the "taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle." Animus lucrandi is a hallmark of mala in se crimes against property. It distinguishes them from mala prohibita, which may be committed without intent.
Third, by historical origin. Before R.A. 6539, taking motor vehicles was prosecuted as Qualified Theft under Article 310 of the RPC. Theft is mala in se. Special laws only specialized the offense and increased the penalty, as recognized in People v. Macaranas, G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017.
Accordingly, Rose is controlling and must be applied. Yet the nature, elements, and history of carnapping with homicide confirm it is substantively mala in se.

29/07/2026

JURISPRUDENCE

Disini v. Secretary of Justice (G.R. 203335, 11 February 2014)
In Disini, the SC explained this qualifying circumstance arises from the fact that in “using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm.”
The elements of libel are the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; publication of the charge; the identity of the person defamed, and the existence of malice. As to the first requirement, the allegation must be a malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For cyber libel, in particular, the publication requirement is satisfied when the allegation is made public through the use of information and communication technologies. For the third requisite, it is not necessary that the person defamed is named. If the totality of the publication makes it possible to determine who the defamed person is, then this element is also satisfied. Finally, malice exists when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.
x x x

In the case of Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation and Ruther Batuigas vs. Victor A Domingo and the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017, it held:

Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.64 For an imputation to be libelous under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.65

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.66 In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.67 ###

Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel.69

There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself."70 ###

On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.73 It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to; or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.74
x x x

In the case of Jannece C Peñalosa vs. Jose A Ocampo, Jr., G.R. No. 230299, April 26, 2023, it held:

The CA said Peñalosa’s act of “maligning” Ocampo through a Facebook post was punishable under Article 255 of the RPC. When the case was brought to the SC, the Court ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case against Peñalosa, pointing out that criminal laws are to be “construed” strictly against the state, and liberally in favor of the accused.

The SC explained that in the libel article under the RPC, the phrase “similar means” does not include “online defamation.”

It added that the associated words are “writing,” “printing,” “lithography,” “engraving,” “radio,” “phonograph,” “painting,” “theatrical exhibition” and “cinematographic exhibition,” and clearly excluded “computer systems or other similar means which may be derived in the future.”

It has ruled that “allegedly libelous” remarks posted online are punishable only under the cybercrime law and not under regular libel. The SC explained that in the libel article under the RPC, the phrase “similar means” does not include “online defamation.”


Recommendation:

In these cases, the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

The elements of the online libel /cyber liber are all present in these cases, to wit:

Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. e. a fifth element or requisite is added under R.A. 10175 for online libel: the act must be committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. To satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify the subject as the object of the defamatory statement (Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil 757 [1922]).

It is not necessary that the person defamed is named. If the totality of the publication makes it possible to determine who the defamed person is, then this element is also satisfied.

To distinguish it from libel committed by traditional means, it is properly called “online libel” although it is sometimes referred to as cyber-libel, internet libel, or electronic libel.

The law provides for a presumption of malice from the defamatory character of a statement (L. Boado, Compact Reviewer in Criminal Law 403-404 [2d ed. 2007]), even if the statement is true.

Hence, the accused, Leepscara Navacilla Bacon is guilty of online libel.
x x x